Strategic Dispersion

Stage II · Peirastes · Companion to "Dispersion and Stratification" v0.3
Tri-mode simulation
A · Control game   B · Historical arcs   C · Adversarial observer

I · ψ_tech(x, t) — Technological Capabilitywarm = frontier

position x → t = 0.00 ← in-group | out-group →

II · ψ_soc(x, t) — Social Positioncool = frontier

position x → ρ = 0.00 ← in-group | out-group →

III · Strategic State — Belief, Rent, Legitimacyyou play the in-group

time → ● true gap Δ   ● belief B   ● your β(t) scoreboard: rent − λ·|Δ−B|

III · Timeline — Regime Shiftshistorical arc playback

Nuclear Arc · 1945 → 2026

Select a preset to load a historical arc. Each regime shift is a discontinuous change in the dispersion operator, triggered by strategic state rather than by continuous drift.

III · ω(k) — True vs Out-group's Inferred Dispersionweaponized underdetermination

wavenumber k → ● true ω(k)   ● out-group's fit   residual shown below gap = ‖ω_true − ω_inferred‖
The inference shown is a simple quadratic-plus-cubic least-squares fit to the out-group's observed |ψ|²(x, t) history. It is a stylized stand-in for "whatever inference procedure an out-group might use" — not a faithful cognitive model. What's real and visible is the structural mismatch: when β is high and changing, no fixed ω(k) fits the observations, and the out-group's best attempt systematically underestimates the asymmetric suppression of high-k modes.